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ABSTRACT: The paper explores the incentive structures and the structurally rigid social 
hierarchies inherent in the polarizing logic of modern credit money and the mutual constitu-
tion of money’s sovereign and biopolitical dimensions.  It is argued that the monetary system 
constitutes a major transitory channel for the logic of financial capital to transcend the limi-
tations of sovereign spaces and to transform itself into a biopolitical force.  The relationship 
between the material and the subjective – or the sovereign and the biopolitical – dimensions of 
money is seen as di-polaric rather than di-chotomic – as a mutually constitutive whole be-
tween relational dynamics and the normalizing opportunity structures which govern such 
interaction.  If the sovereign and the biopolitical dimensions of money indeed constitute dis-
tinct but inseparable moments of the same totality, there would appear to be more room for 
strategic combination of heterogeneous analytical practices in emancipatory scholarship than 
what some of the traditional notions of the epistemological politics of power and sovereignty 
might suggest. 
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Introduction 
Structurally rigid social hierarchies have sometimes been likened to a chessboard.1  As long as 
the hierarchical logic of the board continues to structure social relationships, the argument 
would go, any attempt to achieve social change through the elimination of the ruling class 
would merely reproduce the structural hierarchies symbolized by the board.  While a revolt of 
the pawns might change the specific individuals in the top of the hierarchy, escaping or 
modifying the structural logic of the board would require a radical reconceptualization of the 
desirable forms of social relations – a form of power that is capable of transcending the 
prevailing limitations of the board to modify its scope or content or to discard it altogether. 
Foucault’s ‚agonism‛ or perspectivism, in turn, invites each individual to confront 
power within a given multiplicity of strategic positions.  Although power may be exercised 
rather than possessed, it is possible at any given point in time to focus resistance – or ‚a 
                                                 
1 Erik Olin Wright, Interrogating Inequality: Essays on Class Analysis, Socialism and Marxism (London: Verso, 
1994), 1-2. 
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plurality of resistances‛ 2  – on specific institutions or individuals through which power 
operates.  According to one interpretation, Foucault’s perspectivism could thus perhaps be 
compared to a chessboard where the rules of the game and the capabilities and identities of the 
different pieces are in constant motion: in order to obtain the privilege of being used by power 
in the most exclusive circumstances possible, each piece must engage in constant identity 
politics and struggle for alternative material practices to maximize her utility to power.  
Resistance may prove elusive precisely because power does not permanently reside in any 
specific piece or rule of the board: any act of resistance directed against specific institutions, 
individuals or ‚the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities‛3 may merely alter 
the multiplicity of strategic positions which provides some other institutions or individuals 
with the opportunity to be used by the most prestigious forms of power.  In order to prevent 
the rogue subjectivities from escaping the structural racism of the normalizing state, ‚it is up to 
society and to the rules of the game imposed by the state to ensure that no one is excluded 
from this game in which he is caught up without ever having explicitly wished to take part.‛4 
The governmental logic of the economy – the precise kinds of rules of the game which 
could render the economy amenable to a Foucauldian analysis of power – is, however, never 
explained in more detail.  In The Order of Things Foucault restates several times the analytical 
importance of money in the constitution and articulation of economic relationships: 
 
The theory of money and trade responds to the question: how, in the movement of 
exchange, can prices characterize things – how can money establish a system of signs and 
designation between kinds of wealth?5 
 
For its part, the theory of money and trade explains how any given form of matter can take 
on a signifying function by being related to an object and serving as a permanent sign for 
it<6 
 
The theory of money and prices< unites into one and the same function the possibility of 
giving things a sign, of representing one thing by another, and the possibility of causing a 
sign to shift in relation to what it designates.7 
 
Despite recognition of money’s analytical significance and examination of some aspects of its 
institutional evolution, there is no theory of money, monetary power, or monetarily mediated 
economic rules of the game in The Order of Things or elsewhere in Foucault’s work. 
                                                 
2
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (London: 
Penguin Books, 1978), 96. 
3
 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, translated by Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 77. 
4 Ibid., 202. 
5
 Michel Foucault, The Order Of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications, 
1970), 189-190. 
6 Ibid., 202. 
7 Ibid., 203. 
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This omission is highly significant in at least two respects.  First, from the perspective 
of Foucauldian scholars the absence of a theory of monetary power raises the intriguing 
question on the impact that a more thorough theorization of money might have had on other 
areas of Foucault’s work.  As has often been pointed out, ‚In the most elementary terms, there 
are two distinct and incompatible theories of the origins, development and nature of money‛:8 
either money is an abstract claim which ‚requires its own social and political conditions of 
existence – most importantly, an authority – which are relatively independent of the sphere of 
exchange‛9 or a spontaneously emerging product of the market processes.  In the former case 
monetarily mediated economic governance is feasible in theory, whereas in the latter case 
money cannot exert independent influence on the market processes.  While it appears clear 
that Foucauldian accounts of monetarily mediated economic governmentality would belong to 
the former camp, the implications for some other central aspects of Foucault’s work remain 
largely unexplored.  Once it is agreed that ‚Money is a form of sovereignty, and as such it 
cannot be understood without reference to an authority,‛10 one may also start to question the 
feasibility of strictly periodized separation between different modes of power.  If, for instance, 
it is agreed that monetary power presupposes sovereignty as a condition of its existence and 
that such power has become increasingly salient, the sovereign and the biopolitical modes of 
power would appear to intersect and interact in the present in a manner that may not be easily 
captured by some of the more traditional Foucauldian accounts. 
Second, in the absence of a theory of monetary power – or any alternative theory of 
economic governance for that matter – it may not be entirely obvious what the empirical or 
wider analytical relevance of Foucault’s theorization of the economy might be.  Without a 
more explicit articulation of the ‚secret affinities‛ by which metals, stars, money or some other 
entities of presumed economic relevance ‚communicate with one another and are drawn 
together,‛11 the potential audience for Foucault’s work would appear to be unnecessarily 
narrow.  What is needed is a theory of the economy which reconciles the empirically 
observable patterns for creating and circulating money and non-monetary commodities with 
governmental and biopolitical accounts of the economy.  According to one possible inter-
pretation of the theoretical framework adopted in this paper, such an account of the economy 
could be created by extending the theorization of the mutual constitution of distinct but 
inseparable moments of the same totality into alternative fields of analysis: rather than 
viewing the sovereign and the biopolitical modes of power, for instance, in terms of a 
dialectical confrontation, these forms of power could also be seen as irrevocably intertwined 
and interdependent and thus potentially beyond the explanatory power of simplistic 
classifications based on their relative spatial or temporal dominance.  While the reader may 
disagree with the chosen theoretical approach, merely questioning its faithfulness is unlikely 
to do a service to the Foucauldian analytical tradition.  Paraphrasing Cohen’s remark on 
monetary power, no true theory of economic governance may be said, as yet, to exist. 
                                                 
8
 Geoffrey Ingham, ‚Further reflections on the ontology of money: responses to Lapavitsas and Dodd,‛ 
Economy and Society, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2006), 260. 
9
 Ibid., 261. 
10 Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 12. 
11 Foucault, The Order of Things, 173. 
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This paper seeks to contribute to filling some of the aforementioned theory gaps by 
exploring the role of modern credit money – money that has to be borrowed into existence 
against interest-bearing debt12 – as a structural force which shapes and reproduces social 
hierarchies – both the scope and content of the historically specific or governmentally contin-
gent manifestations of the chessboard analogy – according to the overall strategy of power.13 
Modern credit money is conceptualized as a deterritorializing force, which produces ‚agentic 
subjectivities‛14 through the incentive structures and the structurally rigid social hierarchies 
that are inherent in modern monetary institutions.  It is argued that the modern credit money 
system – and particularly the necessity to pay interest merely to keep money in circulation15 – 
is a major transitory channel for the logic of financial capital to transcend the limitations of 
sovereign spaces and to transform itself into a biopolitical force.  The formation of such con-
stantly evolving biopolitical bodies temporarily emancipates power structures that are tra-
ditionally associated with state sovereignty from their territorial constraints.  The resulting 
divergences between sovereign and monetary spaces provide a spectrum of opportunity for 
sovereign bodies to reterritorialize, reinstitutionalize and reinforce their power in line with the 
strategy of power.  Drawing on Agamben, the relationship between the material and the sub-
jective – or the sovereign and the biopolitical – dimensions of money is seen as di-polaric 
rather than di-chotomic – as a specific instance of ‚the logic of field< where it is impossible to 
draw a line clearly and separate two different substances‛ as ‚the polarity is present and acts 
at each point of the field.‛16  Hence both the sovereign and the biopolitical elements of money 
must be considered to capture the ongoing evolution of the structural pressures that shape and 
reproduce social hierarchies. 
Research that combines insights from several distinct analytical domains or theoretical 
traditions is often justifiably criticized for neglecting relevant literature from all the respective 
fields.  Given that one of the central aims of this paper is to demonstrate the feasibility of a 
monetary theory of economic governance rather than to recount Foucault’s work on money, 
the focus will be on the ‚technical‛ monetary side of the question.  Nonetheless, space con-
                                                 
12 This is the simplest and most parsimonious definition to demonstrate money’s impact on subjectivities, 
incentives, and structural social hierarchies.  While several additions could be made to make the definition 
more ‚modern‛ – although perhaps never unambiguous or stable; see Tero Auvinen, On Money (Rovaniemi: 
Lapland University Press, 2010) – the main findings would remain largely unaffected. 
13 Colin Gordon has summarized the Foucauldian domain of the strategies of power as follows: ‚Whereas 
programmes/technologies of power have essentially to do with the formation of the social real, strategic 
activity consists in the instrumentalisation of the real< Strategy is the exploitation of possibilities which it 
itself discerns and creates< Strategy is the arena of the cynical, the promiscuous, the tacit, in virtue of its 
general logical capacity for the synthesis of the heterogeneous.‛ (Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, translated by Colin Gordon et al., edited by Colin Gordon (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 251, original emphasis) 
14 Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 32. 
15 The interest payments required to keep money – or the mere capacity to monetize real assets – in circu-
lation should not be confused with interest charges involved in the recycling of preexisting monetary 
balances between borrowers and lenders. 
16 Giorgio Agamben quoted in Ulrich Raulff, ‚An Interview with Giorgio Agamben,‛ German Law Journal, 
Vol. 5, No. 5 (2004), 612. 
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straints rule out the discussion of much of the voluminous literature on the political economy, 
sociology and anthropology of money, for instance.  If this paper succeeds in convincing the 
reader of the potential governmental or biopolitical significance of money with the selected 
relatively narrow definition of credit money, it will have attained one of its primary objectives, 
which will permit subsequent analytical work to explore the governmental or biopolitical 
impact of different institutional configurations for money in more detail. 
More generally, this paper indirectly attempts to raise a wider point on the episte-
mological politics surrounding ‚Foucauldian‛ scholarship.  For someone who wrote books in 
order to transform himself17 and ‚to have no face‛18 for the purposes of identity politics, is the 
appropriate methodological standard for assessing the extent to which any specific piece of 
academic work might constitute ‚Foucauldian‛ scholarship not at least partly procedural 
rather than static? In other words, is it not profoundly un-Foucauldian to confuse a methodo-
logical commitment to self-transformation with the specific outcomes of the finite number of 
self-transformations or overhangs of one’s personal discursive labyrinth that one’s lifetime and 
individual predispositions happened to facilitate?  If Foucault’s published work is to be the 
only relevant standard of evaluation, it may be appropriate to add one more name to the long 
list of apparently misinterpreted scholars by pointing out that Foucault was not Foucauldian. 
The argument of the paper is structured as follows.  The first section reverses the Fou-
cauldian tool box approach – applying tools, concepts and terminology from other fields to 
explain the mechanics behind one element of the Foucauldian analytical toolkit rather than the 
other way round – by examining the ontological origins of monetary power and the ‚tech-
nical‛ design features of money which permit monetary power to assume a governmental or 
biopolitical character.  While the triangle of ‚sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as 
its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security,‛19 
may be well known among Foucauldian scholars, the functioning of the precise apparatuses of 
security which allegedly facilitate economic governance of populations must be explicable also 
through alternative terminologies and conceptual frameworks in order to have wider rele-
vance.  Consequently, the aim of this section is to identify a concrete monetary mechanism for 
‚the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the 
phenomena of population to economic processes‛20 – a mechanism which should in theory be 
intelligible also to the economist and the political scientist in addition to the more familiar 
audiences in philosophy and sociology.  The second section explores the structurally rigid 
social hierarchies inherent in the ‚technical‛ specifications of the prevailing forms of money.  
The third section starts to fit the proposed analytical framework on money into some post-
structuralist accounts of power.  The fourth section applies the structural incentives and 
decentralized human agency that are associated with the prevailing forms of money to the 
post-structuralist conceptualizations of Empire to suggest that immanent power may increase 
its perceived legitimacy and intensify social polarization within its sphere of influence through 
                                                 
17
 Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume Three, translated by Robert Hurley et 
al., edited by James D. Faubion (New York, The New Press, 2000), 239-240. 
18
 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), 17. 
19
 Foucault, Power, 219. 
20
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 141. 
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an ‚open source‛ or an interactive process with its subjects.  The essence of the argument is 
that structuralist and post-structuralist forms of power – the contending perspectives of the 
chessboard analogy – may be mutually reinforcing to an extent that many conventional 
accounts of the agency-structure antagonism may have failed to conceive.  The final section 
concludes by pointing out potential complementarities between different theoretical and 
methodological approaches. 
 
The Origins of Money’s Institutional Power, Multiple Potential Spatializations and the 
Capacity to Act as an Incubator of Agentic Subjectivities 
Conventional analysis of the politics of money has often focused on the types of sovereign 
actors that wield monetary power without elaborating on the ontological preconditions for 
such power to exist in the first place.  It has, for instance, been suggested that ‚*o+ne of the 
hallmarks of national sovereignty through the ages has been the right to create money< The 
ability to create its own domestic money is the key financial distinction of a sovereign state.‛21 
According to another articulation of the perceived association between monetary power and 
sovereign spaces, ‚*m+onetary power is a remarkably efficient component of state power< the 
most potent instrument of economic coercion available to states in a position to exercise it.‛22 
While money is often explicitly recognized as a ‚weapon‛ in the economic ‚struggle of man 
against man,‛23 the precise mechanisms through which money may serve the objectives of 
power remain undertheorized.  In the words of one observer, ‚no true theory of monetary 
power may be said, as yet, to exist.‛24 
In order to understand the ontology of monetary power – the ability to influence be-
havior through monetarily-induced transformation of economic, political or social opportunity 
structures – it is necessary to explain both the origins of monetary power in general and the 
factors which permit such power to assume a territorial, governmental or biopolitical 
character, i.e. the specific mechanisms through which the bare potentiality for monetarily 
induced and exercised power assumes the analytical characteristics attributed to the selected 
mode of investigation.  If national currencies are indeed merely territorially branded repre-
sentations of the same uniform and economically neutral monetary commodity which emerges 
through spontaneous market processes to measure economic activity as suggested by neo-
classical economics and much of contemporary social scientific inquiry, analysis of monetary 
power is futile.  As an ‚obscuring layer‛25 or a ‚veil‛26 of ‚real‛ economic processes which 
remain unaffected by the specific choice of the monetary media, political choices relevant to 
                                                 
21 Fred Hirsch, Money International (London: Penguin, 1969), quoted in Benjamin Cohen, The Geography of 
Money (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1. 
22 Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 29, 31. 
23 Max Weber, Economy and society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 108. 
24 Benjamin Cohen, ‚International Finance and International Relations Theory,‛ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse & Beth A. Simmons (ed.), The Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), 434. 
25 Paul Samuelson, Economics, 9th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 55. 
26 Arthur C. Pigou, The Veil of Money (London: Macmillan, 1949), 14. Both quoted in Ingham, The Nature of 
Money, 15. 
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territorialized or biopoliticized monetary power – such as any potential tendencies of states to 
expel all competing but presumably equally neutral measures of value from their territories – 
would be devoid of power considerations.  After all, an ‚obscuring layer‛ by definition cannot 
transform economic spaces through the alteration of transaction costs or any other mechanism 
that could influence the real economy.  Even if the specific aspects of the institutional design of 
money which facilitate the conversion of a presumably neutral technical device into an 
instrument of power projection could be identified, a theory of monetary power that views 
states as the primary actors would also have to explain the precise mechanisms through which 
states manipulate the power-enabling technical design features of money to achieve their 
territorial or biopolitical objectives.  There would be ontologically nothing ‚monetary‛ about 
forms of power which originate outside the monetary system and manifest themselves 
through money in precisely the same manner as any other social institution that is perceived to 
be a mere neutral conductor of exogenous power relations.  The possibility of territorialized or 
biopoliticized monetary power is thus first and foremost a question of the extent to which the 
‚technical‛ specifications of money facilitate the transformation of economic, political or social 
opportunity structures in a manner that is conducive to sovereign power’s territorial or 
biopolitical objectives. 
If the same ontological criteria for identifying the exercise of power may apply to 
virtually any mechanism which permits the controlled transformation of the relevant agentic 
opportunity structures, is there something in the institutional design or the social roles of 
money which could explain the historical or governmental significance of monetary power 
projection?  The precise role that money has played in state building or other forms of 
economic, political or social power projection has often been analyzed in detail.  As Helleiner 
has observed, ‚the construction of territorial currencies was an intensely political process 
involving domestic and international struggles over issues such as the nature of state building, 
the construction of national identities, the proper scale of markets, and the implementation of 
competing market ideologies.‛27  Yet it is not obvious why a presumably neutral facilitator of 
multilateral exchange could shape such a wide range of political objectives – let alone have a 
comparative advantage over alternative institutional tools for the transformation of social 
realities.  The infrastructures for production and exchange involve a virtually infinite set of 
technical arrangements designed to facilitate certain parts of the transactions.  Why has money 
proven to be a more effective instrument for the consolidation or projection of state power 
than many other elements of the infrastructure for production and exchange?  Why have states 
not been equally prone to use, say, territorially branded information systems for creating 
political communities or geographically delimited logistics networks for shaping national 
identities or the proper scale of markets?  Which elements in the institutional design of money 
confer its political powers – the power to transform agentic opportunity structures more 
effectively than many alternative ‚technical‛ features of the prevailing infrastructures for 
production and exchange? Once these powers are actually used, should money still be 
regarded primarily as a facilitator of multilateral exchange with unfortunate but inevitable 
                                                 
27
 Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 2. 
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political side effects, or perhaps as an instrument of power projection that happens to fulfill 
some of the technical functions commonly attributed to the hypothetical notion of politically 
neutral money? While widespread agreement on the nature of money may be neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to understand the nature of monetary power, each contending perspective 
on the ontology of money needs to address these questions if monetary power is to be 
regarded as materially different from the power dimensions involved in other stages of 
production and multilateral exchange. 
What sets money apart from other technical facilitators of production and exchange is 
its institutional capacity to obscure and legitimate the transformation of economic, political 
and social opportunity structures.  Any potential discrepancy between the notion of money as 
a neutral facilitator of multilateral exchange – whether understood as a purely hypothetical 
concept or as a theoretically or practically feasible policy target – and the actual rules and 
norms governing the issuance and circulation of money will have two consequences: (1) it is 
no longer multilateral barter that money is mediating, but a form of exchange which is partly 
defined and constituted by the kinds of money that are used, and (2) money becomes a 
governmental mechanism and a potential tool of biopolitical production: the logic of the 
socially constructed accounting system of money no longer equals the logic of undistorted 
multilateral barter, producing subjectivities which draw their views on what ought to be 
economically feasible, desirable or ‚natural‛ from the distorted monetary logic rather than 
from the logic of undistorted barter.  For the purposes of this paper it may be unnecessary and 
potentially counterproductive to seek a higher degree of unambiguity or definitional particu-
larity than what is accorded by the conventional definition of bio-power as ‚the set of 
mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the 
object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power.‛28  Consequently, rather than 
adopting a single definition for contested concepts such as bio-power or biopolitics, the reader 
is invited to reflect upon the conditions under which specific definitions of controversial 
concepts could potentially fall outside the scope of the monetary analysis presented in this 
paper.  In other words, rather than joining the ‚narcissistic self-contemplation‛29 of some of the 
prevailing institutions for academic knowledge production/preservation by lamenting the 
‚automatic and unreflective use‛30 of selected concepts such as biopolitics while regularly 
overlooking similar treatment of alternative concepts such as money, the burden of proof for 
transgressing the alleged definitional integrity of any specific variant of biopolitics is left to the 
reader: why precisely is the analysis of the monetarily induced transformation of agentic 
opportunity structures presented in this paper inconsistent with any specific mechanism to 
regulate life, death, livelihood, or whatever it is that the specific view on biopolitics regards as 
its central object or mode of analysis? 
                                                 
28
 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2007), 1. 
29 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 92. 
30 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude (Semiotext(e): New York, 2004), 81. 
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While the number of distortions that a dominant authority can introduce into the 
monetary system is potentially infinite,31 two elements of this transformation of a presumably 
mundane infrastructural facilitator of multilateral exchange into an instrument of power 
projection may be particularly illustrative here.  First, the widespread misconception that 
money constitutes the credit of the issuing authority – as opposed to the members of the mone-
tary space – allows the issuing authority effectively to write checks on behalf of the members 
of the monetary space.  It has sometimes been suggested that ‚everyone can create money; the 
problem is to get it accepted.‛32  Although technically incorrect – something that is not widely 
accepted hardly qualifies as money in the first place – the observation does draw attention to 
what it means to ‚get money accepted‛ in the context of non-intrinsically-valued currencies.  
When a central authority with taxation powers is asking an individual to recognize its credit 
notes as money, it is in fact asking the individual to recognize the authority’s debt as her own.  
While the belief that the issuer of such credit notes has the obligation to redeem them for 
goods and services upon demand may help to induce wider acceptance and thus facilitate the 
monetization process, the issuer often has no other ‚backing‛ for the value of the currency 
except its capacity to act as a coercive clearinghouse between the members of the monetary 
space: the goods and services that ‚back‛ the value of the currency must always be extracted 
from some other members of the monetary space rather than being provided by the issuer of 
the currency.33  This may become abundantly clear at times of monetary crises.  If a sufficiently 
large number of the members of a monetary space attempt to convert their monetary IOUs into 
real assets or convertibility is questioned for some other reason, all potential losses accrue to 
the members of the monetary space while the central authority that has acted as the 
                                                 
31 The intention is not to imply that money would be neutral in the absence of authoritatively introduced 
distortions.  To the contrary, the self-referentiality of money may well be irremediable (see Auvinen, On Mo-
ney).  Nonetheless, in order for money to constitute a useful governmental mechanism or tool of biopolitical 
production, there must be some order in the distortionary anarchy of money – some institutional regularities 
which render money more than a mere random transformer of social relations and permit an identifiable 
monetary logic to take over the process of modifying agentic subjectivities and opportunity structures. 
32 Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 228, quoted in 
Stephanie Bell, ‚The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money,‛ Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, 
No. 2 (2001), 150. 
33 A crucial distinction compared to a conventional clearinghouse is, of course, the state’s capacity in many 
cases to regulate both sides of the transaction – to determine the supply of money through its control of 
money creation and to influence the overall demand for money through taxation, among other things.  While 
the bulk of money creation is outsourced to the banking industry, often supervised by an ‚independent‛ 
central bank presumably removed from the realm of politics, the incidence of taxation is typically de-
termined by the state itself.  A not entirely dissimilar governmental impact could be produced by precisely 
the opposite institutional arrangements: the power to determine the size and the incidence of taxation could 
be outsourced to a profit-maximizing private industry, while the nature and amount of money to be created 
and its initial distribution would be subject to political scrutiny and debate.  It may not in practice make 
much of a difference whether ‚economic‛ reality is distorted by a private industry’s profit-maximizing 
manipulation of money creation or a private industry’s profit-maximizing abuse of its taxation powers.  The 
fact that the former practice rarely attracts critical commentary while the latter would be likely to invite more 
widespread scrutiny tells more about the social construction of the economic reality than any features 
allegedly internal to its logic. 
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clearinghouse loses nothing.  The assertion that ‚the creation of money is a two-sided balance 
sheet operation‛34 is thus of little help in determining whose assets are ultimately transferred 
to whom as a result of money creation. 
In a non-intrinsically-valued monetary system the monetary role of the state may thus 
not be entirely dissimilar to a market-maker which stands ready to extract the amount of 
goods and services determined by the social struggle between borrowers and lenders in 
exchange for state-branded but citizen-backed IOUs.  If the individual Smiths and Joneses who 
make up the economy do not willingly redeem all the newly created IOUs effectively issued in 
their name by the banking system, the state may redeem the notes on their behalf to protect the 
value of the currency and either collect taxes or accumulate public debt – both ultimately 
payable by the same Smiths and Joneses – to ‚balance‛ the transactions.  In other words, 
instead of the central bank promising to pay on demand the bearer of a ten pound note ten 
pounds – essentially an identical copy of itself or the corresponding amount in other 
denominations – the text on the note might as well read as follows: ‚Mr.  John Smith [or any 
other individual selected based on the results of the social struggle for control over the state’s 
monetary and coercive powers] promises to pay the bearer on demand ten pounds.  If Mr.  
Smith fails to meet his obligation, the Government of England pays the bearer on demand ten 
pounds and adds the sum to Mr. Smith’s tax liability.‛  Such a payment may involve a re-
duction in the bearer’s tax liability, in which case the payment consists of the goods and 
services that the bearer is not required to provide to the government, or the provision of goods 
and services that the government has extracted from other members of the monetary space.  
Provided that Mr. Smith consents to such an arrangement at all – the chances are that he 
would not if he understood the logic and was able to endure the violence that has historically 
been associated with the sovereign’s monetary trust-building projects35 – he would be well 
advised to demand the government to deliver all such notes that it may issue from time to time 
directly to him rather than spending them into circulation at will.  If all newly created mone-
tary media were automatically delivered to the members of the monetary space debt- and 
interest-free – or if the powers of money creation or money’s debt-activatable potentiality were 
evenly allocated among the transacting parties – the members themselves would largely 
determine the spatial characteristics of the networks of exchange that would emerge as the 
government would have to transparently justify each public spending proposal to the 
electorate before being able to, for instance, spend the members’ IOUs abroad to finance its 
military adventures.  In the absence of such policy constraints originating from the members of 
the monetary space, it is the issuing authority which largely determines the governmental 
characteristics of the monetary networks of exchange rather than some illusory notion of 
‚trust‛ between individuals who happen to be subject to the same monetary central 
authority’s power projection. 
                                                 
34 Bell, 150-151. 
35 Some of the early monetary authorities, for instance, found it necessary to impose severe penalties such as 
fines, flogging, burning foreheads with coins or destroying crops that allowed self-sufficiency to induce the 
adoption of their specific versions of monetary neutrality (e.g. Ingham, The Nature of Money, 2004; Randall 
Wray, Understanding Modern Money (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998)). 
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Second, the practice of issuing money against interest-bearing debt effectively gives the 
issuing authority – or the private entities of its choice – control and ownership over the money 
supply.  Irrespective of whether modern money is conceptualized as debt, a commodity, 
intrinsically worthless symbols of abstract value, or something else, it can hardly be disputed 
that most of it enters into circulation against interest-bearing debt through the commercial 
banking system.  If the issuance of money automatically involves the creation of borrower 
IOUs that exceed the value of the money that is put into circulation – i.e. the total loan plus 
interest payable by the borrower exceeds the value of the monetary IOUs that the banking 
system creates in the process – the issuers can gradually increase their control over economic 
activity within a given monetary space that effectively lacks a permanent money supply or 
capacity to monetize real assets.  Thus, the price of membership in a given debt-based mone-
tary space, far from providing a neutral solution to the problem of double coincidence of 
wants, may approach infinite for a substantial portion of its members in the form of interest 
payments on unrepayable loans.  The requirement to borrow the bulk of the money supply 
into existence against interest-bearing debt substantially diminishes the amount of coercive 
authority that an individual must consent or submit to in order to become a viable subject of 
monetary power projection: as long as the debt contract establishing the individual’s 
responsibility to repay a larger amount of money than was created in the ‚lending‛ process is 
adhered to, the individual’s territorial location or the local cultural or institutional intricacies 
do not significantly alter the type of monetary power that is being projected by the issuer of 
the currency. 
The monetary distortions of the logic of multilateral barter exemplified by these two 
institutional aspects give money both a material and a subjective – or a structural and a post-
structural – character.  Gilbert, for instance, has cogently argued for  
 
the necessity for drawing out the paradoxes of money as always a symbolic referent, a 
social system and a material practice.  The symbolism that money represents defines and 
limits what money can be and can do, just as the forms that money assumes resonate in 
terms of what functions money can perform or what kind of symbolic power it can 
represent.  Neither dimension is sustainable without the other.36 
  
The material and the symbolic or subjective dimensions of money are mutually constitutive 
and in constant interaction with each other, whereby ‚A constant interplay between tech-
niques of power and their object gradually carves out in reality, as a field of reality, population 
and its specific phenomena.‛37 
As a material practice, modern credit money contributes to persistent structural social 
polarization regardless of skill or productivity differences.  At any given point in time the 
monetary system as a whole is technically insolvent, i.e. liabilities exceed assets.38  Such a 
                                                 
36 Emily Gilbert, ‚Common Cents: Situating Money in Time and Place,‛ Economy and Society, Vol. 34, No. 3 
(2005), 361, original emphasis. 
37 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 79. 
38 For the sake of simplicity the example given here involves a situation in which the entire money supply 
has to be borrowed into existence against interest-bearing debt. 
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situation could not arise just by the members of the monetary space issuing monetary IOUs to 
each other, as the valuation of such IOUs would automatically involve any possible interest 
payments – the monetary value and the credit value of the IOUs would be equal by definition.  
The systemic insolvency arises from the requirement that the members of the monetary space 
must incur interest-bearing debt as a precondition for ‚issuing‛ or accessing monetary IOUs, 
which do not include the interest portion of the debt against which they have been created.39 
Consequently, the monetary system itself constitutes a powerful mechanism for upward 
redistribution of wealth.  The main beneficiaries – ‚*t+he lock-in between the political, legal, 
banking and institutionalized monetary system‛40 – accumulate resources through compound 
interest on unrepayable debt required for the mere existence of money, while the over-
whelming majority of the population remains permanently exploited through interest charges 
included in the price of virtually every good and service in the economy. 
As an incubator of agentic subjectivities, money – or, more precisely, the conditions 
under which a sovereign authority is allowed to create IOUs on behalf of the members of the 
monetary space – may have a profound impact on the cognitive frameworks that guide each 
individual’s identity formation, self-conception and capacity for self-actualization and auto-
nomous agency in social relationships.  Money’s symbolic impact extends far beyond 
                                                 
39 For the purposes of this paper, the impact of more ‚modern‛ forms of credit creation can be compared to 
any other activity aiming to extract monetary balances from other members of the monetary space and thus 
forcing someone else to default on their loans – with or without the rat race to borrow against all conceivable 
forms of collateral until the credit bubble bursts and real assets are redistributed.  Although the engineering 
of ever more sophisticated derivative instruments, for instance, may help certain individuals to achieve 
positive monetary net worth at the expense of other members of the monetary space, such engineering per se 
is not responsible for the structural necessity of the zero-sum competition for positive monetary net worth. 
The interest-bearing debt against which the more conventional forms of money are created remains the 
amplifier through which the economic, political and social implications of newly conceived forms of money 
largely materialize.  In an economy with a sufficient debt-free, permanently circulating money supply, for 
instance, ‚banks‛ might be either money warehouses – providing safekeeping and payments services for 
funds that remain outside their own bookkeeping – or matchmakers between borrowers and lenders of 
preexisting monetary balances – a relatively straightforward task that could also be performed by a wide 
variety of market arrangements, lenders’ or borrowers’ cooperatives or virtually any middleman with 
competitive risk assessment skills and perhaps some established avenue for rebranding repackaged 
securities as being beyond their true value before they are sold to investors.  Under such circumstances 
financial engineering would have only a limited capacity to endanger the stability of the entire financial 
system and banks could relatively freely bankrupt themselves through the method of their choice without 
the rest of the economy having to worry about the costs of bailouts or potential system-wide impacts.  In 
contrast, once the monetary system has been rendered structurally insolvent through unrepayable interest-
bearing debt – the community’s money supply and division of labor effectively being held hostage to the 
banking system’s economic and political strategies – it may not be an exaggeration to view financial 
engineering as a potential source of, in the words of Warren Buffett, ‚financial weapons of mass destruction‛ 
in terms of its potential systemic impact.  Nonetheless, as financial engineering remains a specialized 
technique to take advantage of the structural amplifier of unrepayable interest-bearing debt, it is not obvious 
that its distributional impact will be much of a novelty as long as the overwhelming majority of the 
population remains confined to the logic of more conventional forms of unrepayable debt. 
40 Bernard Lietaer, The Future of Money: A New Way to Create Wealth, Work, and a Wiser World (London: Cen-
tury, 2001), 14. 
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nationalistic iconography.  A requirement to borrow one’s own IOU’s into existence from the 
central monetary authority or the private agencies of its choice, for instance, instills a mental 
model of artificial scarcity for guiding agentic behavior.  Opportunities for engaging in social 
relationships involving some of the technical functions of money may be relatively plentiful in 
real terms, yet the monetarily institutionalized and enforced belief that the feasibility of such 
relationships requires the borrowing of monetary IOUs at interest from a central authority 
profoundly transforms the dominant interpretation of economic, political and social oppor-
tunity structures.  As one local currency activist has observed, ‚*t+he real price we pay for 
money is the hold that money has on our sense of what is possible – the prison it builds for our 
imagination.‛41 In case of a conflict between an individual’s organic subjective beliefs and the 
prevailing logic of the socially constructed accounting system of money, the individual will 
have to either readjust her subjectivity in accordance with the rules governing the production 
and circulation of money or adopt a parallel subjectivity that, while being perceived as 
implausible, undesirable, or both, nonetheless facilitates participation in social interaction 
involving some of the technical functions of money.  The monetary system’s influence on 
subjectivity is ontologically and epistemologically dominant in the sense that no amount of 
knowledge claims conceived outside of the monetary logic – whether in the natural sciences, 
ethics, heterodox economic analysis, or some other cognitive framework – can challenge the 
monetary logic’s primacy in regulating monetarily mediated social relationships.  Any specific 
individual may be perfectly free to raise protest on the basis that a given conceptualization of 
money violates the natural laws, ethical principles, economic efficiency or any other self-
referential – from the perspective of the monetary logic – field of knowledge.  Such views, par-
ticularly when uttered in contexts other than monetary, may in fact enjoy relatively 
widespread recognition in their respective fields.  Yet every individual who wants to escape 
the life of an autarkic fugitive beyond the taxation powers of the state must subject herself to 
the subjectic engineering through the use of the prevailing forms of money – no matter how 
inefficient, inequitable or implausible.42  While the most obvious source of such engineering is 
any potential disparity between the rules governing the production and circulation of goods 
and services, on the one hand, and the monetary media, on the other, the precise manner in 
which financial capital is socially constructed can never be neutral with respect to the types of 
subjectivities that the logics and incentive structures inherent in each historically specific or 
governmentally contingent monetary system produce.   
At the most basic level, the autonomous healing of a monetarily damaged subjectivity 
may be prevented by a true belief in the accuracy of the socially constructed accounting system 
of money in capturing the full range of technically feasible opportunities for social interaction 
involving some of the technical functions of money.  An individual might in theory truly be-
lieve that the socially constructed rules for the issuance, subsistence, circulation and extinction 
of money accurately reflect the physical production opportunities in the real world, although 
                                                 
41 Edgar Cahn, quoted in Ibid., 146. 
42 Although there is ontologically nothing monetary about the state’s capacity to appropriate real resources, 
taxation constitutes one of the main mechanisms through which the power-enabling institutional features of 
money are enforced. 
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there is little evidence that such correlation was ever intended to result from the technical 
specification of money in the prevailing manner in the first place or that implementing such 
correlation will ever be technically feasible.  This position requires genuine faith, among other 
things, in the proposition that money is typically designed to measure monetary power 
exercised by others rather than to project power to the benefit of its creators or managers.  In 
other words, in order to assess the relative merits of this view, one may think of the odds that 
all the coercion, institution-building, and power projection associated with the creation and the 
ongoing circulation of territorial currencies has been motivated primarily by the desire to 
measure economic interaction – to expel all competing measures that presumably would have 
been equally accurate and neutral from one’s territory – as opposed to some of the alternative 
power-based explanations.  The questionable intrinsic merits notwithstanding, the implicit 
notion that the social weapon of money is constructed merely to measure power projection by 
others remains widespread.  One of the dominant manifestations in academia is perhaps the 
tendency to undertheorize the political significance of debt merely because all money may be 
conceptualized as debt. 
At another level, an individual may be relatively well aware of the socially constructed 
nature of money and the economic indeterminacy that such realization brings about, but sub-
jectivity nonetheless may continue to be transformed by the structural mechanisms through 
which the artificial scarcity is managed.  Although the socially constructed accounting system 
of money is correctly seen as reflecting power more than the actual physical constraints on 
economic activity, realization of the sheer magnitude of power concentration that the manage-
ment of scarcity through debt-controlled money supply implies may produce distinctively 
opportunistic and focused subjectivities.  For those who are excited by the enhanced oppor-
tunities for socially protectionist Darwinism – essentially uncontested economic, political and 
social domination behind structurally protectionist rules of the game – this realization may 
bring hope of achieving their goals without the inconvenience of having to continuously prove 
themselves in a Hobbesian social world of all against all.  For just about everyone else – in-
cluding diverse groups from egalitarians to libertarians – the debt-based subjectivity may have 
the potential to concentrate minds on the necessity of monetary reform more effectively than 
most alternative cognitive frameworks.  In both cases the power exercised over the individual 
subjectivity gains strength from the patently implausible parallel reality – the debt-ridden 
world of physical plenty43 where actors presumably engage in a social arms race merely to 
                                                 
43 The artificial scarcity managed through the socially constructed accounting system of money may be 
gradually imposing tighter physical constraints on economic activity as the attainment of the implicit liberal 
ideal of an ‚economically efficient‛ extinction of the species approaches.  Despite the devastating impli-
cations also for many other forms of life, the ideal is typically articulated in terms of anthropocentric notions 
of utility.  In a sense, liberal regimes of power have developed their own distinct form of suicide terrorism. In 
contrast to the simultaneous projection of violence and self-infliction of death associated with the traditional 
forms of suicide terrorism, the globalization of liberal governance structures facilitates a temporal divergence 
between these two acts. While the extermination of the deviant subjectivities and modes of life by liberal 
terror is often instantaneous, the survival of the species is likely to be threatened with a time lag as the liberal 
norm life either becomes autonomously alienated from the physical requirements of reproduction or is 
terminated by an environmental change that could have been manageable, had human diversity not been 
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gain recognition for their brands of the neutral veil – which the individual is forced to adopt in 
order to avoid economic, political, social or academic marginalization.  After all, one of the 
psychologically most pervasive forms of power does not involve the simple rewarding of an 
obedient worldview or the willingness to switch between two reasonably justifiable alterna-
tives, but the conditioning of material and immaterial rewards on a worldview that is so pa-
tently implausible that conformity cannot possibly signify anything else than obedience and 
the utter deprivation of the individual’s capacity for plausible self-denial of complicity. 
A focus on the sources of money’s institutional power and the inseparability of its ma-
terial and subjective dimensions foregrounds several undertheorized aspects of money’s 
multiple potential spatializations.  There would, for instance, appear to be nothing inherently 
territorial about the geography of money.  The same governmental impact arising from collec-
tive debt slavery and the structural necessity to engage in zero-sum competition for positive 
monetary net worth can be achieved regardless of the physical location of the different mem-
bers of the monetary space.  The most pertinent spatial metaphor of a monetary system is thus 
likely to be a network irrespective of any potential temporary success of a sovereign authority 
in territorializing the subjectivities and circuits of exploitation involved.  Furthermore, al-
though the material and the symbolic or subjective dimensions of money are mutually consti-
tutive and thus in constant interaction with each other, there is no reason why they should 
coincide either territorially or within the networks of subjects that constitute separate mone-
tary spaces.  The same material logic can be divided into several symbolic subspaces, while the 
same shared subjectivity can be divided into separate material practices. 
 
A Spectrum of Spatializations: Some Structural Social Hierarchies Shaped by Modern 
Credit Money 
Despite the apparent absence of territorial constraints on monetarily-induced transformation 
of subjectivities and the governance of life, monetary spaces are clearly not devoid of struc-
tural fragmentation altogether.  Irrespective of whether such fragmentation is viewed as a pro-
duct of pre-existing and ontologically independent structures or as ‚the mobile effect of a 
regime of multiple governmentalities,‛ the monetary system itself may constitute one of the 
key transmission channels for structural economic and political forces. 
In terms of class analysis – whether conceptualized through conventional social classes, 
‚collective life situations‛ 44  or some other attribute describing persistent structural social 
polarization – modern credit money contributes to a rigid class structure independently of 
education, effort, productivity or any other consideration commonly evoked in defense of 
legitimate income or wealth inequalities.  Modern credit money does not exist unless someone 
within the monetary space – individuals, corporations or governments – borrows it into 
                                                                                                                                                                  
eliminated through sovereign violence.  The elimination of the deviant subjectivities and diversity will 
threaten the survival of the species, but a temporal divergence is introduced between the act of violence and 
the self-infliction of death for the terrorist.  In effect, the liberal mode of suicide terrorism adopts the 
economistic rhetoric of instant gratification through credit creation in its battle for the hearts and minds of 
potential followers against alternative conceptualizations of the human: ‚buy now, pay later‛ becomes 
‚terrorize now, die later.‛ 
44 Ulrich Beck, Individualization (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 207. 
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existence against interest-bearing debt.  Such debt is effectively unrepayable for two reasons: 
the economy as a whole does not have enough money in circulation to meet the interest 
payments as they fall due and in any case economic agents will at all times need some 
currency to clear the desired transactions.  One inquiry into the history of monetary reformist 
ideas articulates the concern on the implications of issuing money against interest-bearing debt 
as follows: 
 
How can we create a free society when there is now less money in the economy – in the 
UK, about £100 billion less – than there is outstanding debt?  Isn’t the inevitable outcome of 
such a situation that the ownership of business, land and property will slip inexorably into 
the hands of the financial institutions, leaving people increasingly enslaved by their 
mortgages and credit cards?45 
 
As economic interaction between individuals and nations is gradually monetized and 
subsistence outside the monetized market mechanism becomes increasingly difficult, the 
amount of money – and thus also the amount of unrepayable interest-bearing debt – required 
for the economy to function increases.  Regardless of the choice of currency, users must incur 
debt and pay interest to the issuers merely to trade physical and human capital that may 
already exist and have been paid for.  The distribution of the benefits and the burden of the 
interest payments are typically highly unequal.  According to one study, only the two highest 
deciles of the population in terms of net interest income are net beneficiaries at the expense of 
the eight lowest deciles, while the largest benefits are disproportionately concentrated on a 
fraction of a percent in the highest income group.46  Hence the class structure imposed by 
modern credit money is consistent with some of the Marxist notions of exploitation and class 
analysis in general, as the interest-based exploitation ‚binds the exploiter and the exploited 
together in a way that economic oppression need not‛ and ‚a substantial proportion of the 
population, at least in the advanced capitalist countries, occupy contradictory locations within 
exploitation relations, locations in which they are simultaneously exploited and exploiters.‛47 
                                                 
45 David Boyle, The Money Changers: Currency Reform from Aristotle to E-Cash (London: Earthscan, 2002), 10. 
Boyle also suggests that the proportion of people living in poverty may have remained relatively stable since 
the 19th century ‚due to some hitherto undiscovered economic ‘law’ about money creation.‛(Ibid.) Any 
potential stability of the relative sizes of the social classes does not need to be related to monetary factors. The 
argument here is concerned with the permanence of the class system itself: as long as the bulk of the money 
supply is issued against interest-bearing debt, it is structurally impossible to eradicate poverty.  In the ab-
sence of redistributionist intervention, the proportion of people living in poverty would be expected to 
increase as opposed to remaining stable.  In other words, the logic that is inherent in both the technical 
specifications of modern credit money as defined in this paper and the rules governing the institutional 
access to the capacity to experiment with more ‚modern‛ variants through financial engineering is highly 
polarizing. 
46 Margrit Kennedy, Interest and Inflation Free Money: Creating an Exchange Medium That Works for Everybody 
and Protects the Earth (Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1995), 25-29. 
47 Erik Olin Wright, Classes (London: Verso, 1985), 75, 288.  The rhetorical – if not in a sense also substantive – 
parallels to Foucault’s work are intriguing.  For Foucault, the relational element which transforms unilateral 
domination into a two-way relationship is freedom: ‚power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects 
are free. If one of them were completely at the other’s disposal and became his thing, an object on which he 
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In world-systems terminology, modern credit money may be conceptualized as a 
relatively autonomous element of a wider structural hierarchy between the economic and poli-
tical units of choice – a system with a clear core group of beneficiaries, periphery of the 
structurally exploited, and a semi-periphery of individuals with an uncertain long-term 
structural status.  As Wallerstein has noted, ‚in ‘world-systems’ we are dealing with a spatial/ 
temporal zone which cuts across many political and cultural units, one that represents an 
integrated zone of activity and institutions which obey certain systemic rules.‛ 48  An 
increasingly important element of such an institutional configuration involves the monetary 
system, which has an individual micro-dimension in addition to the macropolitics of curren-
cies.  The core of such a system consists of individuals with significant positive monetary 
balances, who exploit everyone else outside the core through a mode of accumulation that has 
no efficiency-based economic justification.49  Although the monetary social hierarchy is not 
structurally entirely fixed, such individuals have negligible personal risk of downward social 
mobility due to the continuous upward redistribution of wealth through compound interest.  
The periphery includes the vast majority of the world’s population who have no realistic 
opportunity to escape negative monetary net worth – either personal or government debt – 
through their own productive efforts.  These individuals are subject to constant exploitation 
through resource transfers corresponding to interest payments on unrepayable debt.  The 
semi-periphery consists of individuals whose structural position based on the net effect of 
exploiting the periphery and being exploited by the core remains indeterminate. 
From a Foucauldian perspective, it would appear to be far from inevitable that the 
analytical tool-box should necessarily be discarded or relabeled ad hoc eclecticism, practical 
pluralism, or something else as soon as the focus of investigation turns to the structural 
features of certain types of monetary systems.  Some of the literal interpretations of Foucault’s 
self-proclaimed misgivings about structuralism50 – a label that he often used in such contexts 
to denote the eradication of the analytical significance of the event rather than the theorization 
of its proper relationship to ‚the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities‛ – 
hardly do justice to the actual content of some of his work.  While some of the terminology 
                                                                                                                                                                  
could wreak boundless and limitless violence, there wouldn’t be any relations of power.‛ (Michel Foucault, 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume I, translated by Robert Hurley et 
al., edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 292).  Regarding the contradictory locations of 
individuals in networks of power, Foucault observes that ‚Power is employed and exercised through a net-
like organisation. <individuals <are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising< 
power. <The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.‛ (Foucault, Power/ 
Knowledge, 98) 
48 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 17. 
49 No claims about agency are made here.  The essence of the argument is that a relatively small group of 
individuals with significant positive balances of financial capital is exploiting everyone else through the 
structural features of the monetary system.  In theory, it is not necessary for anyone to be aware of the 
existence of such a radical deleveller in the monetary system, let alone be actively contributing to its 
permanence.  Right combinations of inertia and ignorance might produce similar results. In practice, every-
one participating in monetized market exchange is contributing to, or at least tacitly approving, the 
exploitative logic. 
50
 ‚I don’t see who could be more of an anti-structuralist than myself.‛ (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 114) 
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may differ, the potential for ‚domination‛ to ‚block‛, ‚freeze‛ or ‚fix‛ power relations is in 
fact a recurrent theme in Foucault’s work: 
 
The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes encounters 
what may be called situations or states of domination in which the power relations, instead 
of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, 
remain blocked, frozen.  When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of 
power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by 
economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of 
domination.  In such a state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only 
unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited.51 
 
Of course, states of domination do indeed exist.  In a great many cases, power relations are 
fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited 
margin of freedom.52 
 
I can well imagine societies in which the control of the conduct of others is so well 
regulated in advance that, in a sense, the game is already over.53 
 
While there may remain some customary or normative aversion to invoking structuralist 
terminology in conjunction with Foucauldian analytical symbolism, it is clear that some mobile 
effects of the strategic multiplicities of power positions are more rigid than others, and the 
reasons for such differential rigidity may well be attributable to institutional norms or 
relational constraints such as the material practices and subjective frameworks associated with 
the prevailing forms of money. 
The conceptualization of modern credit money as a relatively autonomous source of 
structural social hierarchies provides a useful analytical tool for understanding the ongoing 
financialization and transnationalization of capital and the opportunities for transnational 
class formation and reterritorialization that they confer to individuals and sovereign bodies.  
The scope of the monetarily induced structural social hierarchies does not need to coincide 
with any other types of institutionalized political spaces.  Such structural spatial indeter-
minacy renders money an exceptionally versatile instrument of geopolitical, biopolitical and 
social power projection.  As one student of the increasingly transnational nature of class 
formation puts it, ‚*t+he class relations of global capitalism are now so deeply internalized 
within every nation-state‛ that the relevant question to ask has become ‚how and by whom in 
the world capitalist system values are produced (organized through what institutions), how 
are they appropriated (through what institutions), and how are these processes changing 
through capitalist globalization.‛54  An analysis of the institutional features of the prevailing 
                                                 
51 Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 283. 
52 Ibid., 292. 
53
 Ibid., 300. 
54 William I. Robinson, ‚Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational State,‛ 
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2007), 23, 24, original emphasis. 
Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 5-34. 
23 
 
forms of the social relation of money would appear to provide a good starting point for ex-
ploring some of these questions. 
 
Rendering the Logic of Financial Capital Biopolitical 
Explaining the structural stratification and the biopolitical potentiality of money in terms of its 
prevailing institutional features provides a concrete link between structuralist and post-
structuralist – as well as economistic and postmodernist – accounts of power: non-economistic 
accounts of economic power can no longer be dismissed as non-economic – as mere post-
modern narratives which allegedly lack a substantive core that could render them intelligible 
to the skeptical positivist.  For those who view the economy as a biopolitical battleground, the 
suggested approach may also provide a useful analytical tool for confirming some of their 
intuitions: irrespective of the specific variant of biopolitics and the role for the state that it 
entails, the institutional features of the social relation of money may explain some of the 
relational dynamics commonly attributed to biopolitical modes of governance. 
The limitations of the traditional state-centric views of power are well known.  In an era 
where it has become increasingly common to suggest that the nation-state itself may exemplify 
the ‚territorial trap‛55 and ‚spaces of flows‛ may be gaining in importance over ‚spaces of 
places,‛56 it would hardly be appropriate to analyze the strategy of state power in exclusively 
territorial terms.57  As one commentator has pointed out, ‚*i+f the individual and the popu-
lation, rather than territory, are the objects and targets of power, then, threat comes from the 
inside of the state not from the outside; insecurity, as well, is redefined in terms of an insecure 
population (poverty, health, well-being) rather than an insecure territory.‛58 Hence the state 
and its population – or the sovereign and the biopolitical spheres of power – would appear to 
be interdependent to an extent that cannot be easily captured by exclusively state-centric or 
territorial conceptualizations of power.  Such interdependent yet tensional power structures 
call, in Agamben’s terminology, for a logic of the field that could overcome the limitations of 
the unipolar territorial views on the strategy of power. 
The traditional state-centric conceptualizations of sovereign authority have increasingly 
been challenged by post-structuralist accounts of power.  According to perhaps one of the 
most influential formulations of the emerging deterritorialization of power and the growing 
pre-eminence of biopolitical forms of influence:   
                                                 
55 John Agnew, ‚The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,‛ 
Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1994), 53-80. 
56 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society – The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996). 
57 In historical materialist circles it has often been questioned whether the state-centric conceptual framework 
ever fully deserved its analytical primacy.  Hannes Lacher, for instance, argues that ‚the ‘nationalization’ or 
‘territorialization’ of social science is very much a phenomenon of the century from the 1870s to the 1970s. 
This itself suggests that the centrality of territorial space to social organization for much of the ‘Westphalian’ 
epoch may be vastly exaggerated.‛ (Hannes Lacher, Beyond Globalization: Capitalism, Territoriality and the 
International Relations of Modernity (London: Routledge, 2006), 9) 
58 Samer Alatout, ‚Towards a Bio-territorial Conception of Power: Territory, Population, and Environmental 
Narratives in Palestine and Israel,‛ Political Geography, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2006), 608. 
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The great industrial and financial powers< produce not only commodities but also 
subjectivities.  They produce agentic subjectivities within the biopolitical context: they pro-
duce needs, social relations, bodies, and minds – which is to say, they produce producers.  
In the biopolitical sphere, life is made to work for production and production is made to 
work for life.59 
 
Such an outcome is at odds with the notion of a disciplinary society, as  
 
In disciplinary society< the relationship between power and the individual remained a 
static one: the disciplinary invasion or power corresponded to the resistance of the 
individual.  By contrast, when power becomes entirely biopolitical, the whole social body 
is comprised by power’s machine and developed in its virtuality.  This relationship is open, 
qualitative, and affective.60 
 
While some of the criticism of Hardt and Negri on depicting the Empire as ‚over-powered and 
under-specified‛61 may be on the mark, their work does highlight the increasingly prominent 
role of the Foucauldian triad of the elements of power – ‚productive, dispersed, and rela-
tional‛62 – in transforming the structural pressures emanating from modern credit money into 
outcomes or opportunity sets favored by the strategy of power in both its sovereign and 
biopolitical manifestations.  According to Foucault: 
 
An analysis in terms of power must not assume that state sovereignty, the form of the law, 
or the overall unity of a domination, is given at the outset; rather, these are only the 
terminal forms power takes. <power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and that 
constitute their own organization; <Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, 
but because it comes from everywhere.63 
 
As a ‚terminal form of power‛ that ‚comes from everywhere,‛ Foucault’s conception of state 
sovereignty has often been criticized for its apparent disregard for the role of human agency in 
shaping structural pressures.  Yet there is also a distinctively network-like element in the 
‚productive, dispersed and relational‛ forms of power, implying that ‚the de-centering of 
power in networks might also be seen as a kind of centering or fixing of power.‛64  As Castells 
puts it, power ‚is no longer concentrated in institutions (the state), organizations (capitalist 
firms), or symbolic controllers (corporate media, churches).  It is diffused in global networks of 
wealth, power, information, and images, which circulate and transmute in a system of variable 
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62 Alatout, ‚Towards a Bio-territorial Conception of Power,‛ 607. 
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geometry and dematerialized geography.  Yet, it does not disappear.  Power still rules society; it 
still shapes, and dominates, us.‛65  The power of modern credit money is distinctively productive 
in the sense that it rewards compliance with the prerogatives of capital by upward social mo-
bility within the structural social hierarchies under its sphere of influence, dispersed as its 
logic applies equally to every individual participating in monetized market exchange, and 
relational in the sense that performance is evaluated against the efforts of other individuals 
rather than some fixed standard that all members of the monetary space could at least in theo-
ry attain.  Furthermore, such power produces norms and expectations that may guide agentic 
behavior long after the specific sovereign institutions where such structural pressures may 
have originated have been dismantled or rescaled.  It is not obvious why such power could not 
‚rule society and shape and dominate us‛ despite the potentially diminished significance of 
the traditional forms of institutional or organizational symbolism. 
The increasingly prominent monetary element of the Empire should thus not be viewed 
as a singular and monolith process of deterritorialization, but as an increasing responsiveness 
of the oscillations between deterritorialization and reterritorialization – or sovereignty and bio-
power – to the strategy of power.  In other words, structural pressures are homogenizing the 
mode of monetary governance rather than the design of the institutional ornaments which 
tailor the converging monetary logic to the local symbolism.  Regardless of the significance of 
the remaining territorial or cultural divisions, the logic of modern credit money has been 
remarkably successful in homogenizing the norms and expectations on the structural necessity 
of zero-sum competition, growing disparities in income and wealth distribution, social 
polarization, ecological collapse, and viewing the prevailing economic and political structures 
as the only ‚realistic‛ alternatives to avert even more serious disasters – whatever they might 
entail.  Once the prisons for the imagination have been socially constructed, it is a relatively 
straightforward task for sovereign authority to reinstitutionalize, reterritorialize or reinforce its 
power in the bricks and mortar world in line with the modified agentic expectations. 
The analytical value of conceptualizing the Empire as a converging incentive structure 
has often been too readily ignored in the absence of evidence of the corresponding conver-
gence of more traditional institutional manifestations of power.  It is not uncommon to see this 
concern articulated along the following lines: 
 
Does not the unilateral turn of the U.S. administration <negate the very principles of Empire 
(based within a recognition of global law and order as prescribed by international 
organisations)?  Does not the U.S. administration’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto 
protocol and from the anti-ballistic-missile treaty, its failure to ratify the Rio pact on 
biodiversity, its reactionary opposition to the ban on landmines, the biological warfare 
convention and the creation of the international criminal court, its progressive delegiti-
mation of the United Nations and its new vision of NATO’s world role – do not all of these 
actions fundamentally undermine the realisation of Empire’s global geography? Are we 
not being faced, perhaps, with an attempt to create a counter-Empire, characterised by a 
militarised globalisation and monolithic imperialism – a far cry from the domination of a 
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biopolitical system of uncertain boundaries and high mobility that Hardt and Negri 
describe – and invite us to combat ‘from the inside’?66 
 
Yet it is not obvious why any potential changes in the hardware of power – the visible insti-
tutional agglomerations of influence – should always transparently reflect the latest develop-
ments in the software of power – the differential agentic capacities to exploit the prevailing 
institutional configurations for the attainment of any given strategic objectives – to produce an 
unambiguous and homogeneous picture of who is exercising structural influence and what the 
ultimate objectives of such forms of power might be.67  State power, unlike the hierarchical 
element of the prevailing forms of money, is structurally indeterminate.  The extent to which 
state power centralizes or decentralizes decision-making authority or responds to democratic 
or particularistic concerns is a matter of ongoing contestation, whereby changes in the access 
to the state’s coercive and legitimating powers among different interest groups are at least in 
theory possible.  The polarizing logic of modern credit money, in contrast, is structurally fixed: 
any modification would require either separate policies aimed at mitigating the ongoing 
polarizing tendencies or a full-scale monetary reform.  Hence any oscillation between the sove-
reign and the biopolitical forms of monetary power is a profoundly political act, which shifts 
the boundaries between the transparently contestable ‚political‛ and the structurally exploita-
tive ‚technical.‛  Every time sovereign power manages to incorporate a newly conceived mode 
of exploitation into the dominant monetary subjectivity – the dominant perception of the set of 
social relations which may legitimately be labeled as ‚monetary‛ – a contentious issue is 
removed from the realm of politics and re-specified as a structural or ‚technical‛ feature of the 
prevailing monetary system.  Every time the evolving monetary subjectivities start to demand 
reform of the material practice of money according to popular preferences, political agency is 
being reclaimed from the territory of the structurally exploitative ‚technical.‛  The evolving 
technical specifications of financial capital modify agentic subjectivities, which in turn shape 
sovereign power’s opportunity structures for geopolitical, biopolitical, or social power projec-
tion.  Such di-polaric oscillation calls for a theoretically and methodologically integrated ap-
proach to the analysis of power.  As Jessop has noted, ‚there is more scope than many believe 
for dialogue between critical Marxist and Foucauldian analyses‛ as ‚Marx seeks to explain the 
why of capital accumulation and state power‛, while ‚Foucault’s analyses of disciplinarity and 
governmentality try to explain the how of economic exploitation and domination.‛68  Agam-
ben’s observation that ‚[i]t can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of a sovereign power‛69 may help to shed further light on the circular mechanisms that 
                                                 
66 Claudio Minca, ‚Empire Goes to War, or, The Ontological Shift in the Transatlantic Divide,‛ ACME, Vol. 2, 
No. 2 (2003), 232, original emphasis. 
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 The purpose of the selected terminology is to emphasize the fact that ‚the multiplicity of force relations‛ 
and ‚the terminal forms of power‛ are conceptually separate entities: any potential transformation of the 
institutional manifestations of the terminal forms of power in response to the shifting multiplicities of force 
relations is not automatic, but the result of agentic preference for institutional transformation over working 
through the prevailing organizational structures and facades of power. 
68 Jessop, 40, original emphasis. 
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permit a nuanced analysis of the strategy of power in addition to its specific institutional 
manifestations.  The following section expands the analysis of modern credit money in the 
context of the oscillations between sovereignty and bio-power to some of the post-structuralist 
conceptualizations of the Empire. 
 
Decentralized Human Agency and the Structural Power of Modern Credit Money: The 
Empire as an Open Source Incentive Structure 
The inseparability of money’s material and subjective dimensions and any potential spatial 
divergences between them call for an analytical framework that is capable of reconciling 
theoretically and methodologically distinct but conceptually intimately related elements of 
money’s multiple potential spatializations.  Money has both a sovereign dimension as a mate-
rial practice emanating from the state’s legislative and coercive powers and a biopolitical 
dimension produced and reproduced through the symbolism and subjectivities that are 
formed, negotiated and contested through interpersonal relations.  The state may have speci-
fied money in a manner that entails collective debt slavery, but the production of the corre-
sponding subjectivities that accept the validity of the state’s version of the socially constructed 
accounting system of money is likely to require personal experience of the structural scarcity 
of money and the presumed economic impossibility of altruistic behavior.  Conversely, a pure-
ly biopolitical awakening and liberation from the identity politics of money may be futile as 
long as the sovereign structures that produce money as a material practice remain intact.  
Although Foucault himself has often been criticized for failing to adequately theorize the inter-
sections between sovereign and bio-power, the Foucauldian framework for understanding 
power as the management of a multiplicity of disparate practices according to a strategic logic 
may be particularly appropriate for capturing the political significance of money’s multiple 
potential spatializations.  More recent insights from Giorgio Agamben complement rather than 
contradict this theoretical approach. 
In Foucauldian terminology, virtually the entire world can be conceptualized as 
governmentally secured – as a governmentally prepackaged set of individuals who conform to 
the material practices and, to a lesser extent, the agentic subjectivities emanating from the 
polarizing logic of modern credit money.  Irrespective of any potential controversies in iden-
tifying the relevant historical and causal mechanisms of transition, it can hardly be ignored 
that virtually the entire world70 has converged on the use of modern credit money.  It is re-
markable to observe how in a world that supposedly boasts of a ‚bewildering diversity of 
forms of articulation between capitalist and noncapitalist practices‛ and multiple logics of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Stanford University Press, 1998), 6, original emphasis. 
70 Potential exceptions tend to rely more on semantics than substance.  The nominally non-interest-charging 
Islamic banking institutions, for instance, are unquestionably involved in money creation and, although bank 
officials may argue that ‚God is in the details‛ (Jerry Useem, ‚Banking on Allah,‛ Fortune, June 12, 2002), 
transactions typically involve payments that may look ‚a lot like interest‛ and amount to sums that are ‚very 
close to the prevailing interest rate.‛(Ibid.) Perhaps unsurprisingly, several commentators within the Muslim 
community have compared contemporary Islamic banking practices to the Contractum Trinius that was 
adopted by moneylenders in medieval Europe to circumvent the Christian church’s ban on usury (see e.g. 
Tarek El Diwany, ‚How the Banks are Subverting Islam’s Ban on Usury,‛ Financial Times, July 14, 2006). 
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‚parasitic forms of primitive accumulation,‛71 virtually every society – whether capitalist or 
communist, industrialized or ‚developing,‛ a proponent of ‚enduring freedom‛ or simply 
‚evil‛ – has adopted the same distinctively capitalist form of monetary institution.  Thus mo-
dern credit money provides a concrete example of the di-polaric circularity of power between 
sovereign and biopolitical forms that has often remained undertheorized in post-structuralist 
accounts of power.  Rather than abolishing territorial boundaries, the Empire’s monetary 
dimension homogenizes the mode of accumulation across territorial space that may or may 
not be divided into relatively autonomous subunits in other spheres of economic or political 
activity.  Once the hyperglobalist overtones of Hardt and Negri have been properly dismissed 
as prematurely ‚assuming away the nation-state‛72 and other relevant institutions, the con-
verging monetary incentive structures can be theorized as mutually reinforcing adaptations of 
the modes of accumulation and governance to the actual historically and socially grounded 
economic and political institutions.   
The thoroughly political and agentic nature of money’s sovereign pole has received 
insufficient attention in contemporary social scientific analysis.  The common accounts of ‚bor-
derless‛, ‚faceless‛ or ‚footloose‛ capital miss the unmistakably physical nature of the institu-
tions and individuals involved in managing the creation and circulation of money according to 
prerogatives whose objectives and justification remain less than perfectly articulated.  Despite 
a colorful history of controversy and contestation, monetary reform has not been able to 
muster sufficient political support, as: 
 
[t]he lock-in between the political, legal, banking and institutionalized monetary system 
has proven invariably too tight to break, even when the proposals came from the most 
influential economist of his time (such as Keynes’ proposal for his bancor) or when they 
were supported by substantial popular movements (such as Gesells’ Freiwirtschaft (‘Free 
Economy’) movement between the two wars).73 
 
While it might be inconceivable for most people to allow doctors, for instance, to convert their 
presumably superior medical knowledge into a social weapon against their patients in a 
Darwinian struggle for existence, no similar moral considerations appear to arise in the public 
consciousness when social struggles of equal or greater significance are channeled through the 
structural logic of modern credit money by the ‚political, legal and banking‛ institutions.  
Hence the colorful adjectives that are often associated with the globalizing capital more often 
than not appear to describe the specific ways in which power manifests itself in the biopolitical 
sphere rather than the wielders of that power in the more old-fashioned physical, territorially-
based institutional structures.   
Although the origins of modern credit money can in virtually every case be traced back 
to sovereign forms of authority, the circulation of money also produces an incentive structure 
that gives rise to a distinctively biopolitical form of power – an ‚open source‛ Empire, where-
by the structural necessity to engage in a zero-sum competition for positive monetary net 
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worth at the expense of other members of the monetary space gradually transforms both the 
material reality and the individual interpretations of what is economically feasible, desirable, 
or ‚natural.‛  The subjects of the governmentally prepackaged biopolitical pool effectively par-
ticipate in perfecting the Empire’s source code – the mechanisms of their own governance – in 
exchange for upward social mobility in the Empire’s structural social hierarchy.  The open 
source Empire forces its every subject to contribute to its own expansion and permanence 
through conditionalizing subsistence on the acceptance of its hierarchical prerogatives while 
continuously adapting and readjusting itself to the prevailing economic, social and political 
conditions.  As no amount of education, technological development or productive activity can 
challenge the structural necessity of zero-sum competition for positive monetary balances 
among individuals, obtaining a sustainable livelihood through monetized market exchange 
requires the persistent competitive exclusion of some other individuals’ needs from the 
marketplace.  In intellectually less disciplined circles – preschool children, for instance, tend to 
be particularly perceptive in this regard – such logic might be compared to a socially 
sanctioned evaluation of each individual’s worth as a human being through an obligatory 
game of musical chairs with a strong discursive commitment to label any individuals 
questioning the rationale for such practices, pointing out the technical feasibility of producing 
more than enough chairs for everyone, or refusing to play altogether as losers who lack the 
skills to win in the game.  Yet no sovereign authority could continuously reproduce the 
requisite economic, social and political structures without continuously shaping and repro-
ducing agentic subjectivities in the biopolitical sphere of power and evoking grand narratives 
of efficiency, progress and objectivity to conceal the preschool foundations of the adult 
playground.  As long as monetized market exchange retains its aura of procedural efficiency 
and justice, imperialism no longer has a need for expensive, inefficient and often state-centered 
central planning structures to enforce social hierarchies and the logic of capital accumulation.  
Under the open source Empire, no individual is too disempowered or marginalized to enhance 
and perpetuate the Empire’s reach by further disempowering her peers in every other sense 
except their capacity to accelerate the centralization of economic and political power.  Rather 
than merely encouraging ‚a state of autonomous alienation from the sense of life and the 
desire for creativity,‛74 the open source Empire thus redefines both the sense of life and 
creativity in zero-sum terms by rewarding competition among individuals while punishing 
altruism.  The fact that genuine efficiency-seeking competition, equality, truth, justice or any 
other instance of conspicuous consumption of moral luxuries provides no material benefits to 
their pursuers in the face of the structural necessity to extract a positive monetary net worth at 
other people’s expense for survival virtually ensures that any innovation motivated by 
pecuniary considerations contributes to economic inequality, social segmentation and other 
familiar consequences of more traditional forms of imperial domination.   
The incentive structure inherent in the open source Empire has effectively emancipated 
exploitation from the constant need to relegitimize and remystify its true nature with profound 
implications for the dominant conception of the human nature.  It has also democratized op-
pression in a manner that co-opts the more materialistically minded segments of its potential 
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opposition – those individuals who wish to obtain a reasonable livelihood through monetized 
market exchange without incurring the money-creating debt themselves – by rewarding 
particularly innovative ways to rebrand exploitation and oppression according to local tastes.  
Virtually any businessman could attest how overly moralistic free marketeers are weeded out 
in favor of the ones who properly see the free market rhetoric as a façade for the centralization 
of economic power.  Most politicians and scholars are unlikely to be blind to the expected 
payoffs associated with rationalizing prevailing or newly conceived forms of exploitation in a 
particularly innovative manner as opposed to adopting unduly inflexible views on the desira-
bility of the pursuit of truth.75   As someone – individuals, corporations or governments – must 
constantly make interest payments on unrepayable debt merely to keep money in circulation, 
these are not abstract moral choices, but literally matters of life and death.  Any altruistically 
inclined individual has to compensate each non-profit maximizing decision by more ruthless 
exploitation of her peers in other instances in order to avoid a relegation to the category of the 
permanently exploited – often entailing drastically reduced quality of life and life span as 
opposed to the romantic notion of a less materialist lifestyle – in the structural social hierarchy 
imposed by modern credit money.  The psychologist and social critic John F. Schumaker has 
noted how we are ‚removed from nature, married to work, adrift from family and friends, 
spiritually starved, sleep deprived, physically unfit, dumbed down, and enslaved to debt‛ as 
‚true love and true happiness <have become uneconomic‛ amidst a consumerist mindset that 
leaves individuals ‚never deeply satisfied, but always in the process of satisfying them-
selves.‛76  Such comments illustrate the extent to which sovereign and biopolitical forms of 
power may already have been convoluted in the popular imagination: it is the personal greed 
or the materialist mindset that is to be blamed for some of the most egregious manifestations 
of social disintegration rather than the structural need to adopt the mindset of a psychopath to 
obtain a living through the zero-sum competitive process of monetized market exchange.  As 
ordinary people are often depicted as capital’s willing executioners rather than victims of 
structural forces that are coercing their compliance, the perceived origin of the structural pres-
sures may increasingly become associated with ‚productive, dispersed and relational‛ as 
opposed to sovereign forms of power, potentially leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy regar-
ding the assumptions concerning the human nature and the origins of the structural 
competitive pressures.         
The globalizing market governed by the logic of modern credit money may thus be 
viewed as a repository of knowledge pertaining to class structures and class formation that 
facilitates the reproduction of social relations within its sphere of influence.  The nearly uni-
versal triumph of transnationally oriented credit money over the isolationist domestic capital 
has increased both the material rewards for domestic elites willing to serve the objectives of 
transnational capital and the opportunity cost of non-transnationally oriented forms of accu-
mulation by instituting deeper international division of labor whereby economies may no 
                                                 
75 Attempts to increase one’s monetary net worth through questionable means – as well as social polarization 
in general – would undoubtedly exist under any form of monetary arrangements.  Nonetheless, the structural 
necessity of the hierarchical competition as well as its zero-sum nature are far from inevitable. 
76 John F. Schumaker, ‚The Happiness Conspiracy,‛ New Internationalist, Issue 391 (July 2006). 
Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 5-34. 
31 
 
longer be able to choose not to trade or to cut off from international capital flows at an accep-
table cost to either domestic elites or the general population.  Even within relatively isolated 
societies the globalizing market governed by the logic of modern credit money constitutes a 
benchmark against which domestic circuits of exploitation can be modeled.  As the possibi-
lities for subsistence outside the system of monetized market exchange approach zero for an 
increasing number of people, every profitable transaction is likely to contribute to a more 
unequal or a more permanently segregated world.  The open source Empire not only fails to 
reward any collectively optimal activities aiming to achieve decentralization of wealth and 
power through genuine economic and political competition, but also disregards any input that 
does not contribute to its inbuilt logic of wealth and power centralization.  As innovative justi-
fications for exploitation are incorporated into the source code and become the benchmark for 
subsequent effort, altruistically motivated actions are forgotten after the performers have 
suffered a one-time loss to move themselves closer to the cast of the permanently exploited.  
While the structural social hierarchies may remain relatively firm, virtually anyone can 
improve her relative position in the hierarchy by demonstrating superior capacity to innovate 
or legitimize more efficient forms of exploitation.  Every time an informational input on a more 
efficient form of exploitation is incorporated into the structure of the open source Empire, the 
Empire approaches the perfectly efficient and legitimized form of exploitation, making it more 
difficult for latecomers to improve their relative position in the structural hierarchy.77  Hence 
the open source Empire may echo De Angelis’ observation that both Hayek’s spontaneous 
market order and Bentham’s panopticon are ‚disciplinary mechanisms faced by individuals 
whose ‘freedom’ is confined to a range of choices set by an agency outside them (the ‘plan-
ner’)‛78 with one crucial difference: under a system of modern credit money, the prisoners (of 
the panopticon or the market) not only become their own guardians, but also participate in 
perfecting the disciplinary and legitimating mechanisms associated with their own im-
prisonment. 
                                                 
77 To illustrate the extent to which the open source Empire has embraced norm-producing institutions to 
legitimize the expansion and intensification of its reach, it is instructive to recall the Nobel Peace Prize of 
2006 awarded to Muhammed Yunus and Grameen Bank ‚for their efforts to create economic and social 
development from below‛ and ‚to advance democracy and human rights‛ through the ‚liberating force‛ of 
microcredit (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, ‚The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006,‛ Press Release, October 13, 
2006).  While microcredit may undoubtedly help to advance the relative position of the borrowers in the 
Darwinian structural social hierarchy, its overall impact is the expansion of the Empire’s reach to previously 
uncharted social spaces.  As long as the lending is governed by the polarizing logic of modern credit money, 
any expansion of lending activity will merely intensify the struggle for positive monetary balances among 
the members of the monetary space.  Every dollar held by any individual – no matter how deserving, 
exploited or oppressed – is a dollar away from the repayment of the debts against which money has been 
created – necessitating a higher default rate – or transfer of ownership of real assets to the ‚political, legal 
and banking‛ institutions in charge of the system – among all other members of the monetary space.  It 
remains to be seen whether the purpose of power will ever be reversed to an extent that would permit the 
efforts of some of the individuals and communities working towards more sustainable and equitable forms 
of social organization to be recognized with similar normative approval. 
78 Massimo De Angelis, ‚The Market as Disciplinary Order: A Comparative Analysis of Hayek and Bent-
ham,‛ Research in Political Economy, Vol. 20 (2002), 293. 
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In Agamben’s terminology, monetary subspaces governed by the logic of modern 
credit money may also be viewed as deterritorialized manifestations of the sovereign state of 
exception and the camp – ‚the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to 
become the rule.‛79  At any given point in time the monetary space as a whole is close to 
insolvency, which facilitates the permanent administration of the state of exception to serve the 
purposes of sovereign power.  In the monetary sphere the state of exception no longer con-
stitutes a device to ‚articulate and hold together the two aspects of the juridico-political 
machine by instituting a threshold of undecidability between anomie and nomos, between life 
and law, between auctoritas and potestas.‛80  The state of exception in which these elements are 
‚blurred together‛ has rather become the rule, transforming the juridico-political system into a 
‚killing machine.‛81   The market-mediated competitive process for positive monetary net 
worth determines the specific spatial and temporal manifestations of the portable camp – the 
specific individuals at the very bottom of the structural social hierarchy, upon whom the 
misery and lawlessness of the camp is imposed through the Empire’s incentive structure. 
The subspaces are internal to the materially determined logic of the monetary system.  
In other words, the precise manner in which an individual experiences the logic of the 
monetary system depends on one’s relative position in the structural social hierarchy.  At the 
top, the technical functions of money are complemented by unjust enrichment through com-
pound interest and privileged access to the latest developments in the evolution of financial 
capital – a form of a monetary state of exception from the sovereign’s perspective, whereby the 
ostensibly neutral monetary rules designed for facilitating multilateral exchange are used to 
circumvent those very same rules for private gain.82  At the bottom – the monetary camp – the 
‚neutral‛ rules for multilateral exchange apply only insofar as they exclude specific individuals 
from such voluntary exchange: voluntary decisions are replaced by forced, unilateral transfer 
of resources structurally mandated by the ‚neutral‛ rules for monetized market exchange.  The 
accumulation of unrepayable debt confines certain individuals into a position where the osten-
sibly neutral technical rules for monetized market exchange as well as universalist humani-
tarian principles have been suspended in favor of structurally mediated resource transfers 
corresponding to interest payments on unrepayable debt.  Irrespective of their territorial loca-
tion, individuals confined to the monetary camp by unrepayable debt and a lack of purchasing 
power for life’s basic necessities have to choose between withering away – in which case new 
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80 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 86. 
81 Ibid. 
82 The appropriate analogy is, of course, the sovereign’s capacity to permanently suspend the rule of law as a 
part of the normal mode of governance.  As Mark Neocleous has observed, ‚Emergency powers do not 
involve some kind of suspension of law while violence takes place, but are unified with law for the exercise 
of violence necessary for the permanent refashioning of order.‛ (Mark Neocleous, ‚The Problem with 
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states of exception such as the unjust enrichment emanating from compound interest on unrepayable debt, 
debt write-offs, unearned seigniorage income, or liquidity provision on favorable terms, for instance, do not 
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victims will promptly be identified by the markets as the dead cannot hold the debt against 
which money has been created – or extracting sufficient positive monetary net worth from 
someone else, thus passing on the personal tragedies caused by the structural scarcity of 
money.  Once the markets have reached their verdict, the carnage of hunger, disease, poverty, 
crime and war – commonly attributed to the victims’ insufficient skills and effort to support 
themselves through market exchange in the hegemonic discourse – can continue unabated 
within the camp. 
The paradox of the intimate conceptual interrelationship – and yet the lack of any 
necessary spatial equivalence – between the material and the symbolic or subjective 
dimensions of money should thus be at the center of any spatial analysis of money.  On the 
one hand, the nearly universally shared logic of modern credit money as illustrated by the 
conceptual framework of the open source Empire can be divided into a number of symbolic 
subspaces along national or territorial lines without any apparent autonomous pressures for 
unification under a single global currency.  On the other hand, the single material practice of 
modern credit money produces a multiplicity of de facto material practices within the same 
monetary space with little pressures for the subspaces of the unjustly enriched or the perma-
nently exploited to become independent monetary entities. 
 
Conclusion 
The paradoxes and contradictions of money as a product of both sovereign power and bio-
power, having both a structural and a post-structural dimension in networks of material 
practices which may or may not contribute to territorialized subjectivities, call for an analytical 
approach that can combine theoretically and methodologically disparate practices into 
strategic combinations through which power – no matter how distributed among specific 
institutional containers – manifests itself.  Modern credit money provides internal coherence to 
structurally rigid social hierarchies – the historically specific or governmentally contingent 
manifestations of the chessboard analogy – which may or may not be institutionalized through 
the exercise of sovereign power.  It also has a colorful history of controversy and contestation 
that structurally oriented economic, political or social analysis that is conscious of the potential 
pitfalls of ahistoricism – or ‚agovernmentalism‛ for that matter – would be unwise to ignore.  
Yet such theorization would hardly be complete without a detailed analysis of the production 
and reproduction of agentic subjectivities through the polarizing logic of the prevailing mone-
tary institutions: the ‚productive, dispersed and relational‛ character that money may adopt 
as it contributes to the formation of biopolitical bodies. 
The British political scientist Herman Finer once noted that ‚if a democracy forgets, 
democracy will be forgotten, and may be crushed by the economic forces it ignores.‛83  Al-
though legitimate divergence of opinion might emerge as to what precisely it is that indi-
viduals concerned with the attainment or preservation of democracy, non-racist non-gover-
nance, subjectic self-determination or some other progressive political objective should not 
forget and how these pressures might originate and be transmitted, the di-polaric nature of 
                                                 
83 Herman Finer, Road to Reaction (London: Dennis Dobson, 1946), 11. 
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money suggests that emancipatory economic, political and social scholarship may have more 
scope for complementary analysis than some of the traditional notions of the epistemological 
politics of power and sovereignty might suggest.  Money as a material practice is the terminal 
form of bio-power, while bio-power is a product of the material practice.  It is the interaction 
between these two poles of money in the context of actual, historically specific or govern-
mentally contingent institutional structures that should be in the center of the analysis of 
monetary power.  Whether such an analytical framework may be labeled Foucauldian in the 
narrowly procedural sense or also in terms of some stationary standard of exogenously 
imposed essentialism may well ultimately prove to be less important than the fact that a theory 
of economic governance – no matter how imperfect or incomplete – based on the ‚technical‛ 
design features of money as an institution has been articulated. 
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